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State ex rel. Vanderpool Feed & Supply Co. v. Sloan
1
Most federal and state appellate courts have established guidelines for
trial courts to follow in ordering the advancement of deposition expenses.
Courts will order the deposing party to advance the opposing attorney's
expenses in a variety of circumstances. Vanderpool presented Missouri courts
with their first opportunity to address such an order.
In Vanderpool, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
upheld the trial court's advancement order. The trial court had condi-
tioned the taking of a deposition upon the deposing party advancing the
opposing attorney's expenses of attending the deposition. Although the
court of appeals found the trial court's order to be clearly authorized under
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 56.01(c),' its decision failed to satisfactorily
address the extent of the trial court's discretion in ordering advancement.
Vanderpool gave notice of the taking of depositions of witnesses in
Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Dallas, Texas.3 Defendants Taylor then sought a
protective order, asking that the court either stay the taking of the deposi-
tions or permit the depositions only on the condition that Vanderpool pay
the expenses and fees of the Taylors' attorneys in attending the depositions.4
After a hearing on the motion, the trial judge announced his intention
to enter an order conditioning the taking of the depositions upon Vander-
pool supplying airline tickets to the Taylors' attorneys to and from the site
of the depositions, plus two hundred dollars per diem for expenses.5 Van-
derpool asked the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent entry
of the protective order, alleging that the trial judge did not have authority
to order the payment of expenses.
6
1. 628 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. App., W.D. 1982).
2. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 56.01(c) provides:
Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or
more of the following: . . . (2) that the discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions . . ..
3. 628 S.W.2d at 415.
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id. at 415-16.
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The court of appeals denied the writ of prohibition.7 The court held
that the Taylors, as movants in the trial court, had the initial burden to
demonstrate facts sufficient to allow entry of a protective order.8 Once the
trial court entered its order and Vanderpool initiated the prohibition pro-
ceeding, the burden shifted to Vanderpool as petitioning party to show that
the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction.9 The court of appeals ruled
that Vanderpool failed to meet this burden.10
The court of appeals held that Rule 56.01(c) gives the trial court au-
thority to order the advancement of expenses as a condition precedent to
the taking of a deposition." The court stated that decisions under the par-
allel federal rule' 2 and similar state rules1 3 clearly recognized the trial
court's power.' 4 The court pointed out that Vanderpool challenged only
the authority of the trial court and not the adequacy of the evidence upon
which the order was based. Therefore, no basis existed upon which the
court of appeals could overturn the trial court's order. 5
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Pritchard stated that the court of ap-
peals should determine for itself whether a factual basis existed for the trial
court's order.' 6 Judge Pritchard felt that the majority had approved the
advancement of expenses upon only the motion therefor; he believed ad-
vancement should not have been approved without a review of the evi-
dence.' 7 He also disputed the majority's statement that decisions under
similar federal and state rules clearly establish the trial court's power to
7. Id at 417.
8. Id at 416.
9. Id The court of appeals also held that the burden on Vanderpool included
overcoming the presumption of right action in favor of the trial court's ruling. The
court stated that the presumption controlled in the absence of any showing to the
contrary by Vanderpool. Id at 417. The dissent contended that the presumption
of right action should not be applied without evidence to support a finding of "an-
noyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" to the opposing
party. Id at 418 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
10. 628 S.W.2d at 417.
11. Id at 416.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The federal rule served as the model for Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 56.01(c). See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56 committee notes.
13. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(c); KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-226(c); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1A-1, Rule 26(c) (Supp. 1979).
14. 628 S.W.2d at 415.
15. Id at 416.
16. Id at 418-19 (Pritchard, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that the
court of appeals should order a record of the trial court action to be filed under the
authority of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 97.01 or 81.12. 628 S.W.2d at 418
(Pritchard, J., dissenting). Judge Clark, in the concurring opinion, noted that there
was no precedent for this procedure in a case of extraordinary remedy and that a
record of the trial court action probably did not exist. Id at 418 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
17. Id at 419-20 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 48
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order the advancement of expenses.
1 8
The court of appeals seems correct in its holding that the trial court
has the authority to order the advancement of expenses, for Rule 56.01(c)
grants Missouri courts broad discretion in establishing conditions upon
which a deposition may be taken. 9 Other federal and state courts also
recognize the broad discretion given to the trial court.20 Nevertheless, the
dissent in anderpool correctly points out that the trial court's discretion is
not unlimited. 2 '
Rule 56.01(c) and other similar state rules require a showing of good
cause before an order will be issued,22 and some courts have noted this re-
quirement as a limitation on the discretion of the trial court. 23 In Madison v.
Travelers Insurance Co. ,24 cited by both the majority2' and the dissent 26 in
Vanderpool, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the broad discretion of
the trial court to issue an order advancing expenses, but the majority also
held that such an order must be based upon a showing of reasonableness
and good cause.
27
The federal rule and similar state rules also require that an advance-
ment order protect a person from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense." 28 Several courts require a showing of unu-
18. Id at 419 (Pritchard, J., dissenting). Judge Pritchard emphasized that trial
courts had not been given absolute power to order the advancement of deposition
expenses. Id at 419 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
19. State ex rel. Naes v. Hart, 548 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
20. The leading case is Gibson v. International Freighting Corp., 8 F.R.D. 487
(E.D. Pa. 1947), aft'd, 173 F.2d 591 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 832 (1949). In
Gibson, the district court held that the taking of a deposition to be offered as evi-
dence at trial and scheduled at a great distance from the forum could be condi-
tioned upon the deposing party advancing the travel expenses of the opposing
party's attorney. The court stated that "the matter is entirely within the Court's
discretion, to be exercised with regard to the particular circumstances of the case."
8 F.R.D. at 488. For other decisions recognizing the broad discretion of the trial
court, see Thompson v. Sun Oil Co., 523 F.2d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1975); Leist v.
Union Oil Co., 82 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Terry v. Modern Woodmen,
57 F.R.D. 141, 143 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Rogers v. Fenton, 115 Ariz. 217, 218, 564 P.2d
906, 907 (Ct. App. 1977); Madison v. Travelers Ins. Co., 308 So. 2d 784, 787 (La.
1975).
21. 628 S.W.2d at 419 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
22. See note 2 supra; see also ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(c); KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-226(c);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, Rule 26(c) (Supp. 1979).
23. See, e.g., United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 34 F.R.D. 532, 533
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Carbine Constr. Co. v. Cooper, 368 So. 2d 541, 542 (Ala. 1979).
24. 308 So. 2d 784 (La. 1975).
25. 628 S.W.2d at 415.
26. Id at 419 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
27. 308 So. 2d at 787.
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(c); KAN. R. Civ. P. 60-226(c);
MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c) (Supp. 1979).
1983]
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sual or impelling circumstances before an order will be issued to advance
expenses.2 9 The majority in Vanderpool, however, does not mention any lim-
itation upon the discretion of the trial court; the court of appeals goes no
further than to recognize the trial court's power to advance expenses.
30
The Vanderpool court also does not address the more specific factors
considered by some courts before expenses will be advanced. The dissent
points out that some federal district courts have adopted local court rules
that authorize the court to order advancement of the opponent's expenses
when the movant schedules a deposition more than a certain distance from
the forum.3" More than forty years ago, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York adopted a rule authorizing the court
to require the deposing party to advance expenses when a deposition was to
take place more than one hundred miles from the courthouse.3 2 The court
has not been hesitant to apply this rule,33 but in Robbins v. Abrams 34 the
New York court emphasized that application of the rule is discretionary
rather than mandatory.3 "
Such a rule has been adopted in only a minority of courts,36 and
neither the Missouri state courts nor the federal district courts in Missouri
have adopted such a rule.3 7 In jurisdictions that have not adopted such
rules, expenses have been advanced when the court finds the deposition will
be held at an inconvenient distance from the forum.
38
29. See Interlego A.G. v. Leslie-Henry Co., 32 F.R.D. 9, 11 (M.D. Pa. 1963);
Towe v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 188 F. Supp. 222, 223 (D. Md. 1960); Weeks v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 5 F.R.D. 17, 18 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Rogers v. Fenton, 115 Ariz. 217, 218,
564 P.2d 906, 907 (Ct. App. 1977); Adkins v. International Harvester Co., 286
S.W.2d 528, 531 (Ky. 1956); Booker v. Everhart, 33 N.C. App. 1, 10, 234 S.E.2d 46,
53 (1977), rev'don other grounds , 294 N.C. 146, 240 S.E.2d 360 (1978).
30. 628 S.W.2d at 416.
31. Id at 419 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
32. S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 16(a).
33. See Schmertz, Oral Depositions: The Low Income Litigant and the Federal Rules,
54 VA. L. REv. 391, 397-403 (1968).
34. 79 F.R.D. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
35. Id at 602.
36. See E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 5(a); DEL. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
37. The dissent in Vanderpool stated that "there is no local rule. . . in this case,
but it should not be assumed that one could be adopted because it might infringe
upon the Supreme Court's rulemaking power." 628 S.W.2d at 419 (Pritchard, J.,
dissenting).
38. See Instituto Per Lo Sviluppo Economico Dell' Italia Meridionale v. Sperti
Prods., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (plaintiff choosing to hold deposi-
tion overseas must advance counsel expenses); Nagle v. United States Lines, 242 F.
Supp. 800, 802 (E.D. Va. 1965) (when deposition only for discovery purposes, must
advance expenses if held at great distance from the forum); Ganem v. Greene, 31
F.R.D. 175, 176-77 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (action brought in Pennsylvania, plaintiff chose
to depose two doctors in New Hampshire, court ordered plaintiff to advance ex-
penses for third party defendant's counsel to attend depositions and attorney's fees
[Vol. 48
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The depositions at issue in Vanderpool were not depositions of any party
to the action, but the deposition of an opposing party is a factor considered
by some courts in the advancement of expenses. For example, several
courts have established a general rule that when the defendant seeks to de-
pose the plaintiff, the plaintiff may be required to travel without reimburse-
ment to the forum for the deposition.3 9 Some courts have eased their
application of this rule and allowed the plaintiff to be deposed outside the
forum when special circumstances make a deposition at the forum a
burden.4
Even in courts that follow this general rule, a party is not entitled as of
right to depose all witnesses at the forum. Several courts require that a
party's preference for deposing at the forum be weighed against the burden
to the opposing party or witness.4 ' This balancing test was established in
for deposition of one doctor not previously listed as a witness); Clair v. Philadelphia
Storage Battery Co., 27 F. Supp. 777, 778 (E.D. Pa. 1939) (deposition ordered held
in most convenient location).
39. See Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F. Supp. 416, 422
(E.D. Wash. 1976) (rule that plaintiff will be required to make himself available for
examination in district in which he has brought suit is also applicable to plaintiff's
agents and employees, especially where plaintiff is responsible for their absence
from district); Hart v. Simons, 29 F.R.D. 146, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (nonresident
plaintiff must make himself available at forum absent some showing of hardship);
Johnston v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 22 F.R.D. 67, 69 (W.D.N.Y. 1956)
(when plaintiff chooses forum, he should make himself available for examination in
forum); Perry v. Edwards, 16 F.R.D. 131, 133 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (ordinarily, party
who chooses forum must be available for examination in forum); Worth v. Trans
World Films, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (requiring plaintiff, a Chi-
cago resident, to travel to New York for deposition in action brought in New York
not an undue burden). But see Nagle v. United States Lines, 242 F. Supp. 800, 802
(E.D. Va. 1965) (court held that plaintiff did not have to travel to forum; if one
party wants to depose other in forum, it should be prepared to pay travel expenses).
See also Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, 80 F.R.D. 22, 23 (D.D.C. 1978)
(court held not improper to require defendants to appear for taking of deposition in
city in which trial will be held).
40. See deDalmady v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 62 F.R.D. 157, 158 (D.P.R.
1973) (rule that plaintiff must travel to forum should not be applied absolutely, but
may yield when special circumstances create burden on plaintiff outweighing any
prejudice to defendant); Seuthe v. Renwal Prods., Inc., 38 F.R.D. 323, 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (plaintiff may be deposed outside forum when special circum-
stances outweigh any prejudice to defendant); Alexander v. Oberndorf, 13 F.R.D.
137, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (requiring plaintiff psychiatrist to travel from California
residence to forum in New York for deposition might constitute annoyance, embar-
rassment, or oppression; but if plaintiff would not travel to New York, she would be
required to advance expenses and attorney's fees for deposition in California);
Boone v. Wynne, 7 F.R.D. 22, 23 (D.D.C. 1947) (unreasonable under circumstances
to require all plaintiffs to travel to forum for depositions).
41. See, e.g., deDalmady v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 62 F.R.D. 157, 159 (D.P.R.
1973); Rogers v. Fenton, 115 Ariz. 217, 218, 564 P.2d 906, 907 (Ct. App. 1977).
1983]
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Hyam v. American Export Lines.42 In Hyam, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated that the test should weigh a party's "ac-
tual, as distinguished from his supposed, need for examination at the forum
. . .against the resulting burden to his opponent.,
43
If the opposing party is a corporation, several courts have held that the
depositions of corporate officers and agents must be held at the corpora-
tion's place of business, especially if the corporation is a defendant." If the
corporation is the party best able to pay the expenses of taking a deposition,
some courts will not order advancement of expenses and may even order
the corporation to pay the expenses of the deposing party.4 5
In Vanderpool, the court of appeals did not examine whether it would be
a financial hardship for the defendant to attend the scheduled depositions.
In some jurisdictions, however, an adequate showing of hardship may be
sufficient grounds on which to order the advancement of expenses. 46 A
mere claim of hardship generally will not be an adequate basis to order
advancement; most courts require a detailed showing of inability to bear
expenses.4 7 Hardship may be shown by affidavits establishing an inability
42. 213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1954).
43. Id at 222.
44. See Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979); Dunn v. Stan-
dard Fire Ins. Co., 92 F.R.D. 31, 32 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Mitchell v. American To-
bacco Co., 33 F.R.D. 262, 263 (M.D. Pa. 1963); Society of Indep. Motion Picture
Producers v. United Detroit Theatres Corp., 8 F.R.D. 453, 455 (E.D. Mich. 1948);
Commander-Larabee Milling Co. v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 7 F.R.D.
168, 169 (W.D.N.Y. 1945); c Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Serv. Co. v. World-
Wide Autos. Corp., 26 F.R.D. 592, 593-94 (D.N.J. 1960) (where German residents
were employees but not managing agents of defendant corporation, they would not
be required to come to New Jersey to be deposed); Fairhope Fabrics, Inc. v. Mo-
hawk Carpet Mills, 140 F. Supp. 313, 314 (D. Mass. 1956) (where corporate defend-
ant did business in Massachusetts and consented to suit in Massachusetts, motion
that oral examination be taken in New York where corporate records and employ-
ees were rather than Boston where plaintiffs requested would be denied unless it
was shown voluminous records would be required).
45. See Leist v. Union Oil Co., 82 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (proper to
consider financial position of deponent and of corporate party for which he works in
determining place of deposition); Terry v. Modem Woodmen, 57 F.R.D. 141, 143
(W.D. Mo. 1972) (where it was not shown that any harm would result to defendant
life insurer's business from agent's brief absence and defendant was best able to bear
cost of deposition, defendant would be required to bear expense); Fischer & Porter
Co. v. Sheffield Corp., 31 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Del. 1962) (since deposition held at
defendant's place of business for convenience of defendant, defendant must pay
plaintiff's and attorneys' traveling expenses and maintenance); accord Tomingas v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 45 F.R.D. 94, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
46. See general Schmertz, supra note 33; see also Empire Box Corp. v. Illinois
Cereal Mills, 47 Del. 350, 352, 91 A.2d 248, 250 (Super. Ct. 1952).
47. See General Leasing Co. v. Lawrence Photo-Graphic Supply, 84 F.R.D.
130, 131 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (claim of financial hardship, taken alone, does not
[Vol. 48
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to pay expenses or a showing of probable loss of employment by the depo-
nent during a trip to the forum." The court may also consider whether the
movant's financial hardship results from the event being litigated.4 9
Expenses may be advanced due to hardship even if the movant is the
deposing party. In Haymes v. Smith,"° the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York ordered state correctional officials to pay
the costs of a deposition scheduled by an indigent prison inmate in an ac-
tion brought against the officials. 5 The court held that it would be an
undue burden for the plaintiff or a legal assistance organization to pay the
costs and expenses of the deposition of one defendant residing in Florida.
52
Courts may also consider which party stands to benefit from the pro-
posed deposition. If the court believes the deposition will only benefit the
deposing party, the court may order that party to pay all expenses. 53 If the
deposition will benefit both parties, each may be ordered to bear its own
costs.
54
The Vanderpool decision does not indicate whether the trial court con-
sidered alternatives to the advancement of expenses. Nevertheless, there are
a number of alternatives that may be pursued before issuing an order to
advance expenses. The dissent in Vanderpool points out that an attorney
who is unable to attend a deposition often will arrange for local counsel to
attend in his place.5 5 Some courts require a movant to pursue this option
before costs will be advanced,56 but circumstances may make retention of
demonstrate exceptional or compelling circumstances); deDalmady v. Price
Waterhouse & Co., 62 F.R.D. 157, 159 (D.P.R. 1973) (naked assertions of hardship
are not enough; affidavits are required); Hart v. Simons, 29 F.R.D. 146, 147 (E.D.
Pa. 1961) (plaintiffs made no showing of exceptional circumstances to justify ad-
vancement of expenses); Pierce v. Brovig, 16 F.R.D. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (mere
statement of financial inability not enough to overcome rule requiring plaintiff to
travel to forum for deposition).
48. See Coburn v. Warner, 12 F.R.D. 188, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
49. See Endte v. Hermes Export Corp., 20 F.R.D. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
50. 73 F.R.D. 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
51. Id at 575.
52. Id
53. See Ganem v. Greene, 31 F.R.D. 175, 176 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Gibson v. Inter-
national Freighting Corp., 8 F.R.D. 487, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1947), aft'd, 173 F.2d 591 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 832 (1949); Empire Box Corp. v. Illinois Cereal Mills, 47
Del. 350, 352, 91 A.2d 248, 250 (Super. Ct. 1952).
54. See Farahmand v. Local Properties, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 80, 83-84 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (where videotape deposition necessary to both parties, each must bear own
costs); Continental Casualty Co. v. Houdry Process Corp., 18 F.R.D. 75, 76 (E.D.
Pa. 1955) (neither plaintiff nor defendant could satisfactorily try case without testi-
mony of certain witnesses); accord Carbine Constr. Co. v. Cooper, 368 So. 2d 541,
543 (Ala. 1979).
55. 628 S.W.2d at 419 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
56. See Nagle v. United States Lines, 242 F. Supp. 800, 801 (E.D. Va. 1965) (no
need to advance expenses where parties have previously retained associate counsel
19831
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local counsel an unnecessary and perhaps prejudicial burden for the
movant.
5 7
Some courts order that depositions be taken either on written interrog-
atories or orally, and the order may require that the deposing party ad-
vance the costs of the deposition if an oral examination is chosen. 58 In
many circumstances, however, it has been held that written interrogatories
would not be an adequate means of discovery, and an oral deposition is
ordered. 59 Parties also may be ordered to choose between alternative loca-
tions for a deposition, ° and future decisions may require parties to consider
conducting a deposition by telephone.
6 1
In Vanderpool, the trial court ordered the advancement of both travel
at distant deposition sites); United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 34 F.R.D.
532, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (no showing of annoyance, harassment, or oppression
which would make local counsel inadequate).
57. See Meredith v. Gavin, 51 F.R.D. 5, 6 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (exceptional cir-
cumstances may work unusual hardship on plaintiff if not represented by his attor-
ney); Sears v. Doty, 47 Del. 442, 444-45, 92 A.2d 604, 605 (1952) (local counsel not
adequate in circumstances).
58. See Jones v. Greyhound Lines, 10 F.R.D. 153, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Boone v.
Wynne, 7 F.R.D. 22, 23 (D.D.C. 1947); Boiczuk v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 5 F.R.D.
18, 18-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
59. See Haymes v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 572, 575 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Instituto Per
Lo Sviluppo Economico Dell' Italia Meridionale v. Sperti Prods., Inc., 47 F.R.D.
530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (differences in language, business practices, and legal cus-
toms between the parties made oral examinations more practical and efficient); In-
terlego A.G. v. Leslie-Henry Co., 32 F.R.D. 9, 11 (M.D. Pa. 1963); Vareltzis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 20 F.R.D. 383, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (details of conversations,
oral reports, and other items could best be brought out by oral examination);
Worth v. Trans World Films, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (cross-exam-
ination necessary to ascertain facts); State v. Mahoney, 103 Ariz. 308, 310, 441 P.2d
68, 69 (1968); Empire Box Corp. v. Illinois Cereal Mills, 47 Del. 350, 352, 91 A.2d
248, 250 (1952).
60. See Haviland & Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 31 F.R.D. 578, 580
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Alexander v. Oberndorf, 13 F.R.D. 137, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Morrison Export Co. v. Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Goodman
v. Lane, 12 F.R.D. 176, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Worth v. Trans World Films, Inc., 1
F.R.D. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Boone v. Wynne, 7 F.R.D. 22, 23 (D.D.C. 1947).
61. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(7), promulgated in 1980, provides
that the court may order a deposition to be taken by telephone. The rule could
benefit parties in several instances. For example, a nonresident plaintiff who is
scheduled to be deposed at the forum might argue that a telephone deposition will
be satisfactory. Telephone depositions may also present an attractive alternative to
written interrogatories. The Missouri courts, however, have not adopted a provi-
sion similar to the federal rule. For a discussion of the federal rule, see 4A J.
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and per diem expenses." Courts generally will advance these expenses in
what is determined to be a reasonable amount.63 A more controversial item
is the attorney's fee charged for attending the deposition. A reasonable fee
may be included in the advancement order.' Some courts, however, rarely
order the advancement of a fee.65 In Nagle v. United States Lines,66 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that it
is usually enough to order the advancement of travel expenses without any
advancement of attorney's fees.
6 7
In Vanderpool, the court of appeals read the trial court's order as al-
lowing only expenses, with no advancement of attorney's fees.6' Therefore,
the court of appeals stated that it would not decide whether the trial court's
discretion includes advancement of attorney's fees.69 It appears, however,
that trial courts in Missouri may not be able to order the advancement of
attorney's fees. Ordinarily, attorney's fees are not recoverable in Missouri
as costs of litigation in the absence of a statute allowing such recovery.
70
Missouri Revised Statutes section 492.59071 limits the expenses of a deposi-
tion that may be taxed as costs. The statute does not include an award of
attorney's fees. In Stogsdill v. General American Life Insurance Co. ,7 the St.
Louis Court of Appeals held that the costs and expenses listed in the statute
could not be construed as including attorney's fees.
7 3
In Vanderpool, the court of appeals distinguished Stogsdill by noting that
the authority of the trial judge in Vanderpool was based on Rule 56, which
was not at issue in Stogsdill.74 Nevertheless, Stogsdill does establish that at-
62. 628 S.W.2d at 415.
63. See, e.g., Nagle v. United States Lines, 242 F. Supp. 800, 802 (E.D. Va.
1965) (nature and extent of depositions may be a factor in amount allowed); Clark
v. Geiger, 31 F.R.D. 268, 271 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (reasonable expenses advanced); Ba-
nana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (plain-
tiffs not required to pay travel expenses that might have been avoided by
defendants).
64. See Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 4 F.R.D. 15, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
65. See Orth v. Bauer, 163 Colo. 136, 143, 429 P.2d 279, 283 (1967) (advance-
ment of attorney's fees solely within discretion of trial court); Vorthman v. Keith E.
Myers Enters., 296 N.W.2d 772, 779 (Iowa 1980) (counsel fees not allowable absent
special circumstances).
66. 242 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Va. 1965).
67. Id at 801.
68. 628 S.W.2d at 416.
69. Id
70. See Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1959); Gerst v. Flinn, 615
S.W.2d 628, 631 (Mo. App., E.D. 1981); Stogsdill v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 541
S.W.2d 696, 701 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); In re L.G., 502 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo. App.,
St. L. 1973).
71. (1978).
72. 541 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
73. Id at 701-02.
74. 628 S.W.2d at 417. InStogsdill, the defendant twice gave notice of a deposi-
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torney's fees may not be included in the taxable costs of a deposition, and
since fees may not be taxed, it appears unlikely that a court will order their
advancement. 7 '
An order advancing costs often is a conditional order. For example,
the court will often order that if the deposing party is later successful at
trial, the expenses of the deposition must then be taxed against the losing
party.76 The advancement of expenses also may be used as a sanction by
the court when a party is dilatory or otherwise abuses the discovery pro-
cess. 77 Advancement may be denied, however, when the motion for a pro-
tective order comes after the deposition has been held 78 or after the date
ending discovery.
79
While other jurisdictions have established one or more of the above
guidelines when considering a motion for the advancement of expenses,
Vanderpool fails to provide similar guidelines for Missouri trial courts. Fur-
ther, the three opinions written in Vanderpool give varying indications of
what factors the Missouri Courts of Appeals will emphasize in reviewing an
advancement order.
In Vanderpool, the majority points out that when Missouri courts model
a rule of civil procedure upon a federal rule, the Missouri courts will con-
sider the construction of the rule by the federal courts as persuasive, but not
tion but then cancelled the deposition in advance. Upon receiving notice a third
time, the plaintiff objected in a hearing before the circuit court. The court ordered
the deposition to proceed but provided for plaintiffs counsel fees and expenses to be
taxed as costs. The court of appeals held that Mo. REv. STAT. § 492.590 (1978) did
not provide for taxing attorney's fees as costs of a deposition. 541 S.W.2d at 701-02.
75. The dissent in Vanderpool noted that the trial court's order did not specify
whether the costs of the deposition could later be taxed against the losing party.
628 S.W.2d at 419 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Connell v. Biltmore Sec. Life Ins. Co., 41 F.R.D. 136, 137 (D.S.C.
1966); Vareltzis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 20 F.R.D. 383, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
77. See Banana Distribs.., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 532, 534
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (party denied travel expense advancement when could have
avoided expenses); Page v. Hooper, 18 F.R.D. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (protective
order denied where party disregarded court order); Flynn v. Superior Court, 152
Cal. Rptr. 796, 800, 89 Cal. App. 3d 491, 498 (1979) (if party seeking protective
order does so for delay, court may award costs to other party); Booker v. Everhart,
33 N.C. App. 1, 10, 234 S.E.2d 46, 53 (1977), reo'don othergrounds, 294 N.C. 146, 240
S.E.2d 360 (1978) (not abuse to order defendant to pay expenses of his deposition
when defendant was himself an attorney and took no action to secure his deposition
from time answer filed in May, 1974 until he went overseas in military service in
1975).
78. See Adkins v. International Harvester Co., 286 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Ky. 1956)
(orderly procedure requires that attorney secure ruling in advance of deposition as
to whether it is conditioned upon payment of expenses).
79. See Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 67
(D.P.R. 1981) (order must be obtained before date set for discovery, and failure to
move at that time will preclude objection later).
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DEPOSITION EXPENSES
conclusive, authority.8" In the concurring opinion, Judge Clark stated that
the court should not look to federal decisions for guidance but rely only on
the facts and circumstances of the case as a basis for decision.8 ' Both the
majority and concurring opinions are correct to a degree. Although an
analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case will form the basis for
decision, Missouri courts still should look to federal decisions for guidance
in applying Rule 56.01(c). Federal decisions enunciate standards on which
federal district courts rely in issuing protective orders, and these standards
would help Missouri trial courts when considering a motion to order ad-
vancement of deposition expenses.
The dissent in Vanderpool states that an order to advance expenses
should not be issued without a showing of reasonableness or good cause.8
2
Rule 56.01(c) also makes it clear that good cause must be shown.8 3 The
majority in Vanderpool has recognized the trial court's broad discretion to
issue protective orders, but appellate courts should be aware that the good
cause requirement in Rule 56.01(c) serves as a limit on the trial court's dis-
cretion. The scope of the trial court's discretion cannot be precisely stated,
but there are several factors that should be of primary importance to the
court in considering an order to advance expenses.
It does not seem that a trial court could properly order the advance-
ment of expenses without examining the following two areas. First, the
court should consider whether the grant or denial of the protective order
will create a hardship for either party. This requires the court to examine
the financial status of the parties, the distance a party may need to travel to
attend the deposition, and which party may benefit from the deposition.
Second, alternatives to a protective order should be considered and perhaps
included in the order. These alternatives include written interrogatories,
telephone depositions, and the attendance of local counsel at the
depositions.
Vanderpool affirms the authority of Missouri trial courts to order ad-
vancement of expenses, but it should not be assumed that the authority
given to the trial courts is unlimited. The Vanderpool majority cited federal
80. 628 S.W.2d at 416. See Kingsley v. Burack, 536 S.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mo. en
banc 1976) (court will consider federal precedent under similar federal rule); Kin-
cannon v. Schoenlaub, 521 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Mo. en banc 1975) (though not con-
trolling, federal decisions construing federal rule which is similar to state rule
should be considered in construing state rule); Bauldin v. Barton County Mut. Ins.
Co., 606 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980) (where state rule is essentially the
same as federal rule, federal precedents are persuasive, not controlling, authority);
State ex. re. Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Bondurant, 523 S.W.2d 587, 588 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1975) (where new state discovery rule had same objectives and purposes
as federal rule, court would consider federal precedent and interpretation in con-
struing and applying new state rule).
81. 628 S.W.2d at 417 (Clark, J., concurring).
82. Id at 419-20 (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
83. See note 2 supra.
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and state decisions recognizing the authority of the trial court to order ad-
vancement; appellate courts in Missouri also should examine these decisions
for guidelines on the limits of the trial court's discretion. Future appellate
decisions should expand on the court's decision in Vanderpool and provide
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